University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Journal of Actuarial Practice 1993-2006

Finance Department

1993

Discussion of Mark J. Browne's "The Definition of
Insurance: Implications for a Health Insurance
Demand Model"
Charles Fuhrer
Washington National Insurance Co.

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/joap
Part of the Accounting Commons, Business Administration, Management, and Operations
Commons, Corporate Finance Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, Insurance
Commons, and the Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons
Fuhrer, Charles, "Discussion of Mark J. Browne's "The Definition of Insurance: Implications for a Health Insurance Demand Model""
(1993). Journal of Actuarial Practice 1993-2006. 168.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/joap/168

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Finance Department at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Actuarial Practice 1993-2006 by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska Lincoln.

VOL. 1, NO.2, 1993

JOURNAL OF ACTUARIAL PRACTICE

Discussion of Mark J. Browne's "The Definition of
Insurance: Implications for a Health Insurance
Demand Model"
Charles Fuhrer*

I would like to thank Professor Mark Browne for this contribution
to the actuarial literature. To the best of my knowledge, actuaries
have not written on the subject of his paper.
I propose alternative measures of the amount of insurance to the
author's Il, 12, and 13. These are:

Il =

l
I

12

=

J=1

J

N

=l

~ E[Bij]
I

13

N

~ E[OOPd

J=1

I1

where i ranges over all insured for all insurance policies. The author
selected his definitions of measures of insurance from the literature
and, of course, is free to define them in any way he desires. I believe
my measures would be more useful, particularly for the purpose of the
paper.
My measures correspond to what would be the normal way of
ordering policies. For example, suppose two policies A and B were
identical except that they had $100 and $200 deductibles, respectively. For my measure, A would provide more insurance than B. This
* Charles S. Fuhrer, FSA (1977) of the Washington National Insurance Co. in
Lincolnshire, IL has been a group insurance actuary since 1973. He is co-editor of
Actuarial Research Clearing House and has given numerous presentations at actuarial
meetings. Mr. Fuhrer has written many papers and has been awarded the 1988
Practitioner's Prize by the AERF and the 1991 Health Section Research Papers Prize.
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is the normal result because A often pays more benefits than Band
never pays less. Under the author's definitions, if A were purchased
by a healthier insurance than B, then A might have a lower value of
12. Generally, I would expect that a measure of the coverage level of
an insurance policy would be independent of the individual that
chooses to purchase it.
The author tries to answer whether certain factors influence the
purchase of different amounts of insurance. Some of these factors are
correlated directly with the demand for health care. Because his
measures of the amount of insurance are affected by the demand for
health care, correlations exist. An interesting question is: "Do individuals who will have a greater demand for health care services
recognize this fact and then purchase insurance policies with greater
reimbursement provisions?" I believe that the author fails to answer
this question.

Charles Fuhrer
Washington National Insurance Co.
300 Tower Parkway
Lincolnshire, IL 60069-3665

Author's Reply to Discussion
The comments of Mr. Charles S. Fuhrer are greatly appreciated.
His suggestion of several alternative measures of insurance is valuable. A primary aim of my paper was to raise the question of how to
determine the amount of coverage an insured has. While my paper
proposes several measures, future researchers may want to consider
the merits of others as well.
Fuhrer's measures of an insurance policy are "independent of the
individual that choose to purchase it." Such measures of insurance
emphasize the contractual provisions of a policy while failing to
account precisely for the amou,nt of risk transferred by the policy.
Little information on the economic value of an insurance policy to an
individual insured can be gained from such measures. The measures,
however, may be valuable for an insurer when examining a complete
book of business.
The question raised by Mr. Fuhrer, of whether individuals who
are higher risks purchase insurance policies with greater reimbursement provisions, is beyond the scope of the current study. This question has been addressed in three prior studies. Interested readers are
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referred to Browne (1992), Browne and Doerpinghaus (1993), and
Browne and Doerpinghaus (1994).
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